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PRIVATIZATION AND POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
Jack M. Beermann*
INTRODUCTION
This article is an attempt to draw some general connections be-
tween privatization and political accountability. Political accounta-
bility is to be understood as the amenability of a government policy
or activity to monitoring through the political process. Although
the main focus of the article is to examine different types of priva-
tization, specifically exploring the ramifications for political ac-
countability of each type, I also engage in some speculation as to
whether there are there situations in which privatization might
raise constitutional concerns related to the degree to which the
particular privatization reduces political accountability for the ac-
tions or decisions of the newly privatized entity. Although some
states have constitutional constraints along these lines,1 current
federal constitutional law does not address directly the constitu-
tionality of privatization along political accountability lines. How-
ever, if a majority of the Supreme Court becomes convinced that a
particular government practice presents serious problems, constitu-
tional limits can be erected in relatively short order.
Court-created constitutional limits on privatization concerning
political accountability have antecedents in recent Tenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence2 and not-so-recent nondelegation cases. In
some nondelegation cases, it was important that policymaking was
delegated to a private group.' Political accountability has, in recent
years, become very important in Supreme Court Tenth Amend-
ment cases. Specifically, the Court has invalidated what it views as
federal "commandeering" of state and local government agencies
and officials on the normative ground that such commandeering
obscures lines of political accountability.5
* Professor of Law and Richard L. Godfrey Faculty Research Scholar, Boston
University School of Law. Thanks to Ron Cass, Ward Farnsworth, and Kate Silbaugh
for help with the ideas put forward in this article.
1. Infra notes 39, 54 and accompanying text.
2. Infra Part I.B.1.
3. Infra notes 9, 14-18 and accompanying text.
4. Id.
5. Infra Part I.B.1.
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There are so many varieties of "privatization" that privatization
is difficult to define and analyze comprehensively. Most generally,
privatization denotes the moving of something that had been in the
public sphere into the private sphere. However, movement from
public to private is not absolutely necessary, because something
may be called privatized even if it always has been private, merely
because it is publicly administered in another jurisdiction. Priva-
tization analysis also captures entities such as government corpora-
tions that straddle the public/private divide and were created to
address a particular policy problem in ways that are not clearly
public or private. Further, although marketization and deregula-
tion may be more accurate appellations, privatization may be used
to describe an entity or activity that was always privately owned
but has moved from a heavily regulated status to a less regulated
one.' The privatization label is accurate because decisions that
were once made in a regulatory agency now are made privately in
response to market forces.
Privatization thus denotes a broad spectrum of adjustments to
the interaction between government and various private actors.
One concern about privatization is that it can lead to less political
accountability. In order to evaluate privatization through a politi-
cal accountability lens, two questions need to be answered. First,
has privatization actually reduced political accountability? Second,
if political accountability has been reduced, is it a cause for concern
in the particular context?
Viewed through the lens of political accountability, it quickly be-
comes clear that all privatizations are not created equal. Some
forms of privatization may tend to reduce political accountability,
some forms may be neutral, and some, surprisingly, actually may
increase political accountability. The main purpose of this article is
to look for these differences among different types of privatization.
Part I introduces the concept of political accountability, with an
eye toward speculation on whether a constitutional law of account-
ability in privatization might develop. Part II describes different
categories of privatization and examines each type of privatization
for its effects on political accountability, with some appropriate ex-
cursions into accountability-based or influenced constitutional doc-
6. The change in utility regulation is such an example. Most electric utilities and
telephone companies in the United States were always private, but in recent years
have moved to a more market-oriented system of operation. Jack M. Beermann, The
Reach of Administrative Law in the United States, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 171 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
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trines. Part III briefly discusses the application of the Freedom of
Information Act and related statues and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act to the activities of entities involved in privatization. The
article concludes with a plea for a non-ideological attitude toward
privatization, based on the variations among privatizations in polit-
ical accountability and other terms.
I. ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
I am concerned here with the amenability of a government pol-
icy or activity to monitoring through the political process. There
are several different ways in which a government policy or activity
can be more or less subject to political monitoring. Political ac-
countability should be understood to include the democratic char-
acter of decision-making, the clarity of responsibility for an action
or policy within the political system, and the ability of the body
politic to obtain accurate information about a governmental policy
or action.
The democratic character of decision-making involves the degree
to which the body politic can influence a decision, policy, or activ-
ity through political activity. The clarity of responsibility for an
action or policy involves the degree to which the body politic can
discern who in the political system is responsible for a decision,
policy, or activity, so that efforts to exert political influence can be
directed to the proper authorities. The ability of the body politic to
obtain accurate information depends on the degree to which infor-
mation on the activities is available. All these, and perhaps others
not mentioned here, are distinct but related criteria for judging po-
litical accountability.
Assume for present purposes that at least some forms of priva-
tization reduce the political accountability of a government activity
or practice. For example, if Congress were to privatize fully the
United States Postal Service,7 it is likely that it would be more diffi-
cult for the political system to influence the organization of the
Postal Service, as well as postal rates and services. Although priva-
tized, the Postal Service might remain highly regulated. If the Pos-
tal Service retained its monopoly over certain aspects of mail
delivery, it is likely that Congress and the executive branch would
subject the Postal Service to both formal and informal scrutiny,
such as rate regulation and political pressure over other aspects of
7. By "privatize fully," I mean charter the Postal Service as a private corporation,
offer shares to the public, and allow the private corporation to choose its officers and
directors under corporate law without government involvement.
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the Postal Service's organization. Nevertheless, it is likely that
there would be less political influence over Postal Service decisions
and activities because the decision-making process might be less
democratic. It also might be unclear whether the private entity or
the government regulators were responsible for any particular ac-
tion. Similarly, it might be more difficult for the public to obtain
information about the operations of the privatized entity.
At present, privatizations face few, if any, federal constitutional
hurdles.8 For example, there is no doctrine of federal constitu-
tional law that prevents municipalities from selling municipally
owned electric utilities, mass transit systems, or professional sports
facilities to private entities. Along the same lines, federal constitu-
tional law has little, if anything, to say about a decision to contract
with private entities for provision of public services, such as police
and fire protection, operation of jails and prisons, street cleaning,
garbage collection, inspectional services, and maintenance of pub-
lic parks and buildings. There is no general federal anti-privatiza-
tion doctrine requiring that particular government activities, state
or federal, be conducted only by traditional government
employees.
I do not mean to say that federal constitutional law has abso-
lutely nothing to say about privatization. For example, if Congress
were to decide to privatize the Postal Service and the privatized
Postal Service were given the power to make governmental deci-
sions without discernible statutory standards or governmental
oversight, a delegation doctrine attack could be mounted.9 If the
8. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQUETTE
L. REV. 449, 455-56, 480 (1988) ("While privatization presents many legal issues, it
does not confront serious legal constraints other than process requirements."). Dean
Cass analyzes three constitutional constraints on or impediments to privatization,
none of which have proven, thus far, to be serious impediments to privatization.
These are: (1) applying the nondelegation doctrine, which limits Congress's ability to
delegate legislative power to the executive branch and to private organizations, (2)
holding government liable for the conduct of the private entity, and (3) holding the
private entity liable (under public law norms) without affording the private entity
immunities or privileges enjoyed by government. The second possible legal response
discourages privatization, because it removes a potential incentive to privatize, i.e.,
that government is no longer responsible for the activity. The third possible legal re-
sponse tends to make it more expensive to privatize an activity than to keep it inside
government because it makes it easier to hold the private entity liable than it would
be to hold government or government officials liable for the same conduct. Id. at 497-
512; Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Priva-
tization, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 481, 481-82 (Supp. 1998) (discussing "paucity" of consti-
tutional limitations on privatization).
9. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (noting that delegation
problems were exacerbated because delegation was to private parties rather than gov-
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resulting entity were quasi-public, or some sort of government cor-
poration with partial government control, the method of ap-
pointing directors and other officers might be subject to scrutiny
under the Appointments Clause.10
A. The Appointments Clause
The best candidate for a federal constitutional constraint on
privatization of federal government activities may be the Appoint-
ments Clause. The Appointments Clause specifies the method for
appointing "Officers of the United States."'1 Principal officers
must be appointed by the President "with the advice and consent
of the Senate."' 12 Inferior officers may be appointed in the same
way, but Congress may also legislate appointment by the President
alone (without senatorial advice and consent) or appointment by a
court of law or head of a department of the federal government.13
A person is an "Officer of the United States" for Appointments
Clause purposes if that person "exercis[es] significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States."14 If Congress legislated
the privatization of a federal agency-for example, if it decided to
delegate the administration of federal environmental law to a pri-
vately-owned "Environmental Protection Agency, Inc.,"-the ap-
pointment of officials within the corporation would be subject to
Appointments Clause attack, insofar as corporate officials exer-
cised authority to enforce federal law, including rulemaking and
other enforcement activities. 5
A recent decision of the D.C. Circuit suggests that not all em-
ployees of the federal government must be appointed pursuant to
the Appointments Clause.' 6 That court held that Administrative
Law Judges who make recommendations to higher officials are
ernment officials); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 501 (1935);
A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV.
543, 574-77 (discussing delegations to private entities).
10. Froomkin, supra note 9, at 574-77; see also infra Part II.E (discussing govern-
ment corporations).
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976) (per curiam).
15. There are numerous government corporations that perform functions that
might otherwise be performed by government agencies. Insofar as the appointment of
officers and directors of these corporations departs from the Appointments Clause
model, they may be subject to constitutional challenge. See Froomkin, supra note 9, at
574-77.
16. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1130-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
2001] 1511
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"employees" and not "officers" who must be appointed pursuant
to the Appointments Clause.'" Apparently the D.C. Circuit be-
lieves that an official does not "exercise significant authority pursu-
ant to the laws of the United States" unless that official has some
power to make decisions with legal effect.1"
In the case of a corporation formed to administer federal law, it
would appear that the Appointments Clause presents a serious bar
to allowing federal law to be administered by privately hired cor-
porate directors, officers, or other employees. Even under the
D.C. Circuit's relaxed view of the applicability of the Appoint-
ments Clause, a corporate employee not appointed pursuant to the
Appointments Clause could not take action that would have an ac-
tual effect on a member of the public.'9 Rather, insofar as their
actions were aimed at having some effect in enforcing federal law,
corporate employees might be able only to make recommendations
that would be carried out by properly appointed Officers of the
United States. This would significantly reduce the utility of the
privatization of the agency function.
The Appointments Clause is directly related to political account-
ability concerns. Even under the D.C. Circuit's view, federal offi-
cials with power to enforce federal law must be appointed
politically. Principal Officers must be acceptable both to the Presi-
dent and a majority of the Senate. Many inferior officers also will
be appointed politically, by the President or a department head.2°
17. Id. at 1125.
18. Id. The status of the D.C. Circuit's rule in Landry is somewhat doubtful be-
cause there is no Supreme Court authority to the effect that there are federal "em-
ployees" whose appointment is not subject to the Appointments Clause. Interestingly,
the Supreme Court case that provides the D.C. Circuit some support is actually a
privatization case in which the Supreme Court approved contracting out to persons
providing support services for federal agencies without complying with the Appoint-
ments Clause. See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878) (holding that a
surgeon was not an "Officer of the United States," because he was employed only on
an as needed, fee for services, basis). Other Supreme Court cases cited by the D.C.
Circuit provide only general definitions of "Officers of the United States." E.g., Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976), cited in Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133. Another
case relied on heavily by the D.C. Circuit in Landry, United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S.
303, 306-07 (1888), cited in Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133, actually provides support for the
contrary view, that all federal employees are subject to the Appointments Clause. In
Mouat, the Court held that a navy "paymaster" could not collect business travel ex-
penses, because he was not appointed properly pursuant to the Appointments Clause.
United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1888).
19. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
20. Historically, the courts of law have not appointed many inferior executive of-
ficers. A notable exception is the independent counsel, under the now-expired Ethics
in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified in scattered
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Appointment through the political process is a device to keep offi-
cials exercising federal authority somewhat politically accountable.
Removal power may be even more important to political ac-
countability than appointment power. After all, federal judges are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, but they are shielded from political influence by their protec-
tion from removal except by impeachment. The Supreme Court
has rejected attempts by Congress to assign executive functions to
officials removable by Congress on the ground that executive offi-
cials should be accountable to the President, not to Congress.2'
The possibility of removal of such officials by an executive branch
officer accountable to the President might be sufficient to preserve
the separation of powers,22 but any attempt to shield completely
officers of the United States from removal initiated by political of-
ficials within the executive branch would probably violate account-
ability-preserving separation of powers principles.
B. Direct Constitutional Limits on Privatization
Thus, privatization of activities amounting to private execution
of federal law might present serious constitutional problems arising
from the appointment and removal of the directors, officers, and
employees of the private entities that would enforce federal law in
the privatized regime. What is missing, however, is a more direct
analysis of the constitutionality of privatization. There may be cer-
tain functions that should not be privatized based on some princi-
ple that particular governmental functions must be performed only
by government itself. Concerns about maintaining political ac-
countability may counsel against privatization. For example, imag-
ine a private regulatory agency-would we tolerate administrative
rulemaking by a privately-owned "Environmental Protection
Agency, Inc.," charged with administering the environmental laws?
Regardless of how accountable EPA, Inc., might be to Congress
and whether notice and comment and judicial review applied in
exactly the same way as they do to the actual Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("EPA"), the lack of direct political accountability
through the President might make such a reform unwise or unac-
sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.), provisions that were at issue in Morri-
son v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
21. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
22. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that Congress may restrict
removal of independent counsel to removal for cause by the attorney general, and
that the President need not have removal power).
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ceptable. Although the example may seem far fetched, it actually
is not all that different from the provision of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 that privatized some as-
pects of the medical device approval process and proposals to ex-
tend private review functions into the drug approval process.2 3
The above analysis is applicable to federal privatization, and re-
ally would not touch state and local efforts to privatize. It is thus at
least interesting, if not potentially fruitful, to speculate about the
possibility of a more direct analysis of privatization generally. This
is where the creative potential in constitutional law comes in. Al-
though under current law there is no direct constitutional analysis
of privatization, concerns about political accountability of priva-
tized government provide for the possible evolution of a doctrine
evaluating whether a privatized government function lacks suffi-
cient accountability.
1. Tenth Amendment Limits on Privatization
It is useful to remember that current Tenth Amendment juris-
prudence arose quite recently out of the ashes of the Court's failed
attempt to construct a general Tenth Amendment standard for
evaluating whether federal regulation of state and local govern-
ment activity went too far. Under National League of Cities v.
Usery,24 the Court created and applied a three-factor test to scruti-
nize federal regulation of state government for compliance with
Tenth Amendment limits on federal power. Under that test, as ap-
plied in later cases, "federal regulations are subject to Tenth
Amendment attack only if they regulat[e] the States as States, ad-
dress matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty,
and impair the States' ability to structure integral operations in ar-
eas of traditional functions. "25 The Court was divided over
whether commandeering violated this test, with the majority hold-
ing that commandeering did not necessarily impermissibly displace
state sovereignty. 26 Political accountability was not relevant to the
23. See Nick Littlefield & Nicole R. Hadas, A Survey of Developments in Food
and Drug Law from July 1998 to November 1999, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35, 41 (2000)
(describing use of private reviewers for low risk medical devices under Title II of the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999)).
24. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
25. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763-64 n.28 (1982) (internal quotations and
citations omitted) (alteration in original).
26. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 & n.25 (characterizing Justice
O'Connor's anticommandeering analysis as "demonstrably incorrect").
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Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence under National League
of Cities.
Post-National League of Cities Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
has been built largely on a normative base concerned with issues of
political accountability. The political accountability basis for Tenth
Amendment limitations on Congress's power to regulate states
goes back only to a dissent by Justice O'Connor in a 1982 case,
FERC v. Mississippi, in which the Court upheld federal regulations
that placed certain, largely procedural, obligations on state utility
regulatory agencies.27 In that dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, argued strongly against
allowing the federal government to compel state agencies and offi-
cials to carry out federal regulation.28 She argued forcefully that it
should be unconstitutional for the federal government to regulate
via a state agency.29 One of her primary normative arguments
against what has come to be called "commandeering" is that "Con-
gressional compulsion of state agencies, unlike pre-emption, blurs
the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that
their representatives are no longer responsive to local needs."3 In
other words, the problem with federal law that requires states to
regulate individuals in line with federal standards is that "lines of
political accountability" become blurred, and it becomes uncertain
who should be held politically responsible for the regulation.
After Justice O'Connor's dissent, two interesting developments
occurred. First, the Court overruled National League of Cities, im-
plying that the Tenth Amendment placed no legally enforceable
restrictions on Congress' power to regulate states as states.31 Sec-
ond, the Court has twice struck down federal legislation on a new
Tenth Amendment theory, erecting what looks like a per se rule
against federal commandeering of state agencies.32 Under this
rule, although federal law may regulate states in their own activi-
ties, and may regulate private parties to the extent federal power
over an area exists, it may not force state agencies and state offi-
27. Id. at 775-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 787 (citation omitted).
31. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
32. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992). Regulation of states' own activities is still allowed, although the
line between commandeering and regulating a state's own activities is not particularly
clear. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding statute that prohibited
states from selling driver's license information pertaining to individual license holders
despite argument that statute regulated the state's treatment of third parties).
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cials to regulate private parties. The primary normative basis for
this anti-commandeering rule has been the problems that comman-
deering causes with regard to political accountability. 33
2. A Potential Accountability-Based Doctrine
This has been a rather long story to make a rather narrow point:
it is within current judicial practice on the Supreme Court of the
United States that concerns over political accountability could give
rise to a federal constitutional doctrine analyzing privatization for
fidelity to structural constitutional principles.34  Although some
doctrines of constitutional law appear to spring from nowhere,35 an
accountability-based norm for evaluating privatization at least
would appear to evolve from pre-existing Tenth Amendment ac-
countability-based norms.
Without the benefit of even a suggestion by a member or mem-
bers of the Court, it is difficult to imagine what an accountability-
based limitation on privatization might look like. With regard to
federal law, perhaps using the Court's definition of "Officer of the
United States" as a starting point,36 the Court could attempt to de-
fine "execution of federal law," and then create a rule barring such
execution except by an agency of the federal government. Advo-
cates of a rule disallowing private exercise of governmental power
face the difficult task of satisfactorily distinguishing governmental
from private power, for there are many situations in which private
entities carry out the terms of federal law under which they are
regulated or subsidized.
33. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("[W]here the Federal
Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal
officials is diminished.").
34. The politics of privatization make the emergence of such a doctrine unlikely
now or in the near future for the simple reason that the conservative members of the
Court are likely to favor privatization. President George W. Bush is likely to appoint
Justices who share this view. The Justice's legal doctrines are designed to effectuate
their normative political views, and law has very little to do with Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking, at least in cases implicating strongly held political views.
35. For example, I daresay that before Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), very few
observers of federal constitutional law would have found in that law a norm subject-
ing variations in ballot counting procedures to strict scrutiny and holding that differ-
ing standards for counting ballots would be held to violate equal protection without
regard to whether they were the product of intentional discrimination and without
regard to the government interest underlying the differing standards. I believe a simi-
lar story could be told about Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or at least its primary
antecedent, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1975), and limits on exercise of government power by private persons and
entities).
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Accountability considerations might be of some help in distin-
guishing permissible from impermissible privatization. An ac-
countable agency might satisfy concerns over privatization in the
following manner. Consider, for example, partial privatization of
environmental enforcement. Congress could adopt legislation al-
lowing a private entity to monitor pollution and certify to the EPA
that all regulatory requirements have been met. The legislation
could allow the EPA to establish standards and actually choose the
private entities qualified to perform the monitoring and make the
necessary certifications. If the EPA provided clear instructions to
the private enforcers, and remained fully accountable for successes
and failures of the privatized regulatory scheme, and if complete
information were available regarding the activities of the private
company, accountability might not prove an impediment to
privatization.
Since federal authority is exercised by entities of many different
forms, a direct analysis of federal privatization also would require a
definition of "agency of the federal government." In addition to
traditional departments and agencies within departments, there are
agencies outside of departments, independent agencies, wholly
owned government corporations, corporations partly-owned by the
federal government, and privately owned but federally chartered
corporations. Even if a rule confining the exercise of certain pow-
ers to the government were created, a formal, pragmatic, or func-
tional test would be necessary to determine whether a particular
entity was governmental and could exercise government power.
It is much less likely that federal constitutional limits on state
privatization would be recognized, because state law would govern
questions regarding the proper organization of state government
and federal separation of powers norms would be irrelevant. The
substance of the Guarantee Clause a7 might include limits on state
privatization, but that clause has not been judicially enforced with
any vigor.3" If a state privatized government activities to shield
them from scrutiny by the public, would that violate the Guarantee
Clause, or some other federal principle, like one-person one-vote?
State constitutions themselves contain limits such as accountability
37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
38. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding that Guarantee
Clause issues surrounding which of two competing state governments was legitimate
were nonjusticiable).
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provisions and separation of powers norms, and these might pro-
vide some limits on privatization of state government activities. 9
The likelihood that accountability concerns would motivate
courts, particularly the Supreme Court of the United States, to
limit privatization depends, at least in part, on how serious of a
perception there is that privatization reduces political accountabil-
ity where political accountability is desirable. Although I do not
predict that such a doctrine will arise, and I do not attempt to out-
line the specifics of such an accountability-based anti-privatization
constitutional doctrine, it is worthwhile to consider whether priva-
tization has the potential for causing accountability problems as se-
rious or more serious than those that the Court states motivate its
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. The current Court does not ap-
pear to be ideologically disposed against privatization. Quite the
contrary appears to be true, and thus the proponents of anti-priva-
tization constitutional law have an uphill battle if they attempt to
convince what appears to be a conservative Court that privatiza-
tion is an evil the Court should resist.4 °
39. See Julie H. Vallarelli, Note, State Constitutional Restraints on the Privatization
of Education, 72 B.U. L. REV. 381, 393 (1992) (discussing limitations on privatization
that may inhere in state "accountability" clauses). Vallarelli cites the Massachusetts
constitution which provides: "All power residing originally in the people, and being
derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested with
authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents,
and are at all times accountable to them." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. V. The federal
Accountability Clause does not appear to address privatization; it is a prohibition on
spending federal money without congressional authorization, and it requires that ex-
penditures be accounted for: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account
of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time." U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7. For some state constitutional challenges to priva-
tization, see Hicks v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 678 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding a
decision to privatize streets around housing project and enforce trespass laws on pri-
vate streets against constitutional challenge); FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of
Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (finding the privatization of a water project an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private entity); Tex. Boll Weevil
Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997) (declaring a statute
allowing a private entity to receive public funds to eradicate pests an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to private entity). Some state constitutions also
have "civil service clauses" which can limit privatization, insofar as non-civil service
employees perform government functions. See CAL. CONsT. art. VII, § 1; State Comp.
Ins. Fund v. Riley, 69 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1937) (state civil service clause implicitly prohib-
its contracting out for services traditionally performed by the state); see also Prof'l
Eng'rs v. Dep't of Transp., 936 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1997).
40. The best hope for a declaration of unconstitutionality with regard to a struc-
tural matter normally exists when the Court is convinced that a particular constitu-
tional procedure, such as the Appointments Clause, has been violated. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Privatization could cause problems of political accountability
similar to those caused when the federal government commandeers
state officials to carry out federal policy. As elaborated below, if a
private entity were entrusted with carrying out a government activ-
ity, it might be difficult for the public to know whom in the political
system to blame when things go wrong. The accountability effects
would vary greatly among the contexts in which privatization has
occurred. Thus, the next section of this article looks at a wide array
of privatizations and explores the accountability issues that inhere
in each.
II. PRIVATIZATIONS
In his comprehensive review of the policy issues underlying the
privatization movement,41 Ronald Cass divided privatizations into
four categories: (1) divestiture, which means the sale of govern-
ment assets including state-owned enterprises; (2) contracting out,
which means contracting with private parties for performance of
both internal and external functions such as cleaning and maintain-
ing government buildings and providing government services to
members of the public; (3) deregulation and vouchers, which mean
reducing or eliminating regulation of private entities so that deci-
sions are made privately rather than politically or giving benefits
recipients the choice to go into the market for goods and services
rather than being confined to those provided directly by govern-
ment; and (4) tax reduction and employing user fees, which is
privatization in that it either returns money to private entities or at
least targets payments to government so that private parties do not
have to pay for government services they do not want. With some
refinement, these are useful categories for analyzing privatization
in accountability terms. In addition to these categories, I consider
special issues that arise regarding government corporations and
similar public/private partnerships, and I also focus attention on
the application of procedural structures such as the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") 42 and the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA")4 3 to private entities involved in privatization.
41. Cass, supra note 8, at 449.
42. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
43. Id. § 552.
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A. Divestiture
Divestiture includes two distinct activities, selling government
assets such as land, buildings, or equipment that the government
decides are no longer useful assets, and selling government owned
enterprises, such as state owned transportation, housing, or utili-
ties, where the intent is for the private owner to continue to oper-
ate the enterprise in government's stead. As long as asset sales are
conducted pursuant to normal government procedures, accounta-
bility is less of an issue in asset sales than in the sale of enterprises.
Of course, once an asset becomes private, its use is likely to be
subject to less government supervision than when it was under
public ownership, so an accountability issue does exist. For exam-
ple, if the government sells a tract of undeveloped land, govern-
ment regulation of that land's use is likely to be less than if
government retained ownership. There may be controversy over
government's decision to divest itself of an asset, but the sale of a
raw asset does not significantly affect political accountability over
an activity that has moved from the public into the private sector.
Sale of an ongoing government enterprise presents a greater pos-
sibility that reduced political accountability will be a significant re-
sult of the sale. For example, when the federal government sold
Conrail, the railroad became less subject to political control than
when it was owned by the federal government.44 If a local govern-
ment sells its bus service or its electric utility to a private company
(or converts the existing entity to a private corporation by publicly
offering shares), political control is likely to be less than under con-
tinued government ownership and operation.45
The difference in political accountability has to do with the de-
gree to which ongoing discretionary operational decision-making is
made under direct government control. For example, in a publicly
owned bus service, political accountability for the level of service
44. CONSOL. RAIL CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONRAIL (1999) (describing the
history of Conrail, including its formation by the federal government and ultimate
privatization), http://www.conrail.com/history.htm.
45. Municipally owned utilities are common in the United States. My guess is that
most water and sewer services, where they exist, are provided through municipal or
state sewer and water agencies. Municipal power companies are also still quite com-
mon, with recent newspaper articles identifying, for example, forty municipal electric
companies in Massachusetts that serve customers in fifty-eight municipalities and pro-
vide "about 13 percent of the state's power needs," at prices substantially lower than
those charged by privately owned utilities even under deregulation. Bruce Mohl,
Power Rates Up, But Officials Insist Deregulation Working, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26,
2001 at C1, 10; Peter J. Howe, It Pays to Be Local: Municipal Electric Customers
Dodging Rate Increases of Big Utilities, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2001 at C1, 10.
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provided and the prices charged is direct. Voters can reward or
punish legislators and elected executive officials for the perform-
ance of the service. A privatized system might be subject to a wide
range of regulation, but privatization is almost certain to lessen the
degree to which those running the bus company are subject to po-
litical accountability for their decisions. The regulators, of course,
remain politically accountable and politicians might be blamed (or
praised) for the privatization decision itself.
The ability of the body politic to influence the operation of the
privatized enterprise is likely to be reduced after the sale. How-
ever, strict government regulation can maintain a high degree of
political accountability. This has been especially true in developed
countries in which many utilities and large enterprises were state-
owned and only recently have been privatized. 6 These countries
may have more recently begun to marketize the operation of these
enterprises, which would further reduce political accountability,
but private ownership does not necessarily eliminate significant po-
litical accountability for the operation of privatized enterprises. 7
The ability of the public to identify who is responsible for
problems in the operation of the privatized entity also may be low-
ered after privatization, although that is not necessarily the case.
The issue of public employee labor unions is discussed infra.48
With regard to a private, but highly regulated, enterprise, govern-
ment and the private owners may blame each other when post-
privatization problems arise. Further, as often has been the case
with regulated industries, what the public understands as regula-
tion may be experienced and understood by the regulators and reg-
ulated as subsidization.49
Privatized enterprises also might be able to avoid procedural and
openness restrictions that apply to government-owned enterprises.
Regulation might require the enterprise to submit financial infor-
mation for government review, but in most situations FOIA princi-
ples and procedural protections such as those contained in the
46. See generally Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses to Privatisation and
Outsourcing, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40 (Michael Taggart ed.,
1997).
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 53, 111 and accompanying text.
49. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 140 (1982) (describing
how pressure for regulation "invariably" comes from regulated parties, not the pub-
lic); see also Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation through Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
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APA are unlikely to apply to privatized enterprises. ° The market
may provide an adequate substitute if the privatized entity is
forced to compete in an open market, but political accountability
per se is likely to be reduced.
B. Contracting Out
The second form of privatization Cass analyzes is called "con-
tracting out." Here, too, the general category includes different
types of privatization that raise radically different accountability is-
sues. Contracting out describes an incredibly wide range of possi-
ble privatization. On the most mundane level, government
procurement of office supplies and other necessary goods and ser-
vices unrelated to discretionary government decision-making or co-
ercive government action can be seen as a form of privatization,
especially if government decides to purchase something on the
market that it, at one time, produced itself. I call the goods and
services involved here "support goods and services" because they
support government's ability to perform its functions but do not
involve dealings with the public in the governing sense.
No business produces all the goods it uses, and the same reasons
that lead firms to contract out should lead government to contract
out.51 Government may, for example, shut down a heating plant
used to heat government buildings and purchase heat from private
sources. The United States Government Printing Office produces
and sells government publications, and it is easy to imagine priva-
tization of some, most, or all of the printing and sales.
In my view, contracting out of support goods and services does
not raise serious accountability issues since the source and quality
of such goods and services are not normally something the public
cares much about. Of course, corruption in the procurement pro-
cess may be an issue, and obviously procurement fraud does not
exist without procurement, but government officials remain ac-
countable for overspending on goods and services, and the savings
from competition to sell to the government is likely to dwarf any
increased potential for fraud that procurement entails.
Procurement of support goods and services does raise one cen-
tral area of controversy in privatization-labor issues. Privatiza-
50. See infra Part Ill.
51. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)
(describing how increasing monitoring costs as firms grow larger lead firms to con-
tract out, thereby gaining market discipline in the place of hierarchical discipline
within the firm).
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tion of support goods and services often is advocated as a money
saving proposition, and from the perspective of government work-
ers, the money is saved at their expense. Often, the most vocal
opponents of privatization proposals of many types including sup-
port goods and services are the government workers who either
would lose their jobs, face transfer to different units, or who may
end up working for the private company hired to provide the good
or service.52
Although government workers may lack legal standing to chal-
lenge privatization,53 they are often a potent political force in op-
posing privatization.54 There is at least a perception that some of
the gains from privatization come from the ability of private busi-
ness to operate free from the necessity of dealing with government
workers who have strong civil service protections regarding job se-
curity and work rules.
Government workers can make some traditional labor argu-
ments against privatization. Government workers have very strong
protection of job security in the form of civil service statutes and
rules.55 Further, government workers enjoy constitutional protec-
tions that are not shared by workers in the private sector, both in
terms of due process protections of job security and anti-discrimi-
nation norms that apply only to state action. Government workers
also may be protected by statutory anti-discrimination norms and
by executive orders that do not apply in the private sector.56 There
52. See, e.g., Judith Havemann, Welfare Reform Incorporated: Social Policy Going
Private; States Turning Agencies Over to Business, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1997, at Al;
Editorial, Charter Amendment is Ill Advised, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 3, 2000,
at 22 ("Moreover, this amendment would be a regrettable precedent. It is a brainchild
of organized labor, which hates the privatization of public jobs."); Brian C. Mooney,
DeNucci May Bar $305m Bus Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1997, at B3 ("Privatiza-
tion, a watchword of Governor William F. Weld's administration and a political battle
cry for organized labor, faces a crucial test today.").
53. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S.
517, 530 (1991) (postal workers union lacks standing to challenge Postal Service's de-
cision to give up its monopoly over international remailing services).
54. As noted supra note 39, civil service protection for government workers is
mandated in some state constitutions. This mandate can become a protection against
privatization, prohibiting private, non-civil service employees from performing work
traditionally performed by government employees. See CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Riley, 69 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1937); Prof'l Eng'rs v. Dep't of
Transp., 936 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1997).
55. See generally Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1611, 1619-76 (1984) (describing civil service system).
56. Exec. Order No. 13,087, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1998) (prohibiting discrimination in the
federal government on the basis of sexual orientation); Exec. Order No. 13,152, 3
C.F.R. 264 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in the federal government on the basis
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also may be a feeling that, in addition to special rules like civil ser-
vice protections, the legal rights of workers in many areas such as
anti-discrimination and wage and hour protections are respected
and enforced more in the public sector than in the private sector.
From one perspective, privatization that shakes an agency loose
from labor related restriction can increase accountability, in sort of
a perverse way. There are some circumstances in which govern-
ment bureaucrats can place the blame for their failure to fulfill
their missions or operate efficiently on labor restrictions, arguing
that government workers have such great job security that it is im-
possible to get them to work hard, or that work rules are enforced
so strictly in the government setting that it is impossible to accom-
plish anything innovative.57 Whether these or similar stories are
true is beside the point. They are certainly believable, and they
allow agencies to dodge accountability for their failings.
An agency that has privatized a function can no longer shift
blame to government workers and strictly enforced work rules.
Accountability is thus enhanced. When the private entity chosen
to perform the function fails to perform adequately, blame can be
placed squarely with the agency that chose the private company or
the agency that is supposed to monitor the performance of the pri-
vate entity. One major qualification is that an agency can attempt
to avoid blame by pointing to procurement rules that forced it to
choose an inferior supplier because that supplier had the best bid
within the restrictive rules.
Another form of contracting out straddles the territory between
contracting out for support goods and services and privatizations
that affect the public. For example, road building and maintenance
are public-oriented government activities but normally do not in-
volve any policymaking or discretionary decision-making that
would raise serious accountability concerns. I expect that the fed-
eral, state, or local transportation department hiring the private
firm would remain fully accountable for the performance of the
private firm, although the same labor issues raised above arise
here. Further, as in procurement, the cost of bringing all road
of parental status). This situation has been equalized somewhat by executive orders
that apply to government contractors. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961)
(discussing how government contractors also have been held to higher standards than
others with regard to employment discrimination and affirmative action).
57. See Developments in the Law: Public Employment, supra note 55, at 1631
(describing civil service system as "a barrier to the dismissal of incompetent employ-
ees and an impediment to government efficiency").
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building and maintenance in house would be too great to justify
small gains in government accountability.
Contracting out also can involve activities that raise serious is-
sues of government accountability, in which the government pays a
private entity to perform an activity that might normally be per-
formed by the government involving discretion and government
power over individuals and other private entities. This category
includes private operation of institutions that perform governmen-
tal functions, like privately operated prisons and even privately op-
erated public schools; 58 private provision of government services
such as educational services for special needs or emotionally dis-
turbed students; and private administration of welfare, social wel-
fare, and social insurance programs. There are two sides to this
group; one I call provision of services and the other I call benefits
decision-making, both of which have been privatized in some juris-
dictions. In the provision of services category, government can
contract out the operation of public schools, treatment and educa-
tional facilities for mentally ill children, social services for ne-
glected and abused children, and a host of other institutions that
could be operated by government. On the benefits decision-mak-
ing side, the function of making benefits determinations and paying
benefits under welfare and social insurance programs has been
privatized, with private companies, subject to government supervi-
sion, determining coverage and making payments to individuals
and health care providers, for example.
Both of these types of contracting out can raise serious accounta-
bility issues. If a local school board decides to hire a private com-
pany to operate the public schools under contract, questions arise
concerning the ability of the school board, and through the board,
the public, to control the operation of the schools. The school
board normally maintains control over the schools through budget-
ary approval and the hiring and firing of important personnel, in-
cluding the superintendent and principals. The school board also
58. For example, my employer, Boston University, operates the school system of
Chelsea, Massachusetts, under a contract with the local school committee. There are
also private companies that step in to operate poorly performing schools under con-
tract. See Edward Wyatt, Privatizing of Five Schools Faces a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2001, at B3 (discussing the New York City Board of Education's plan to turn
management of city's lowest performing schools over to Edison Schools, Inc., a pri-
vate company in the business of operating public schools); Nora Coronado, Kearney,
Liberty school districts contract out summer programs, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 21,
2001, at 5 (reporting on Kansas school districts' contracts with Edison Schools, Inc., to
run summer school programs).
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may maintain control by requiring that some matters that might
appear to be day-to-day issues come before the board for approval.
Accountability can be reduced even if the school board maintains
ultimate control over the schools through the choice of the con-
tracting party, unless mechanisms are established to maintain con-
trol over and scrutiny of the details of school operation.
In the private prisons context, the issues are somewhat different.
The public is not as interested in the day-to-day operation of pris-
ons as it is in the day-to-day operation of public schools. The pub-
lic is concerned that prisons are secure. Although some private
groups monitor the treatment of inmates and raise concerns when
inmates are mistreated, in my view the general public shows little
concern for the marginal welfare of inmates as long as they are not
treated brutally while in prison.59 Privatization of prisons and
other government functions has raised concerns that the profit mo-
tive of private corporations running prisons and other institutions
will lead to lower quality services, which in the prison context
means less secure facilities and ill treatment of inmates. 60 The
profit motive, it is feared, could lead private prisons to hire fewer
guards, risking escape and inmate violence, as well as to the curtail-
ment of programs such as recreation and education that are more
costly than simply warehousing inmates. 61 It is also feared that pri-
vate prisons may try to save money by providing less favorable
physical conditions and inferior food.62 Further, it is feared that
private prison guards will not be as well-trained and disciplined,
and this might lead them to use more force against inmates, mak-
ing brutality a more serious problem in private prisons.63
These issues surrounding private prisons are more substantive
than accountability based. Presumably, a government agency will
be responsible for monitoring the performance of private prisons.
If escapes occur, or if a scandal over the mistreatment of inmates
erupts, the officials of that agency and those in government who
59. This is a wholly unsupported intuition. An interesting argument against pri-
vate prisons is that the profit motives leads private prison operators to lobby for
longer sentences so that the need for prisons will increase. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent,
The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO.
L.J. 2143, 2159 n.101 (1996), Chase Riveland, Prison Management Trends, 1975-2025,
26 CRIME & JUST. 163, 194 (1999), Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An
Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 671 (1987).
60. See Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 813, 815 (1987).
61. See id. at 815-16.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 816.
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supervise them will suffer the political consequences. Although
general issues regarding treatment of inmates have not, in most cir-
cumstances, been a significant political issue, if a controversy were
to erupt, it may be more difficult for the body politic, perhaps
through legislative hearings and action, to monitor and influence
the performance of private prisons than publicly operated ones.
Some substantive concerns over private prisons have been raised
and partially answered by legal decisions. The primary question is
whether inmates will lose the ability to enforce government's con-
stitutional obligation to provide adequate conditions of confine-
ment and not use excessive force against inmates. Although it is
not completely settled, it appears that private prisons are subject to
the same constitutional constraints and obligations that apply to
government-run prisons,64 and the ability to enforce those con-
straints and obligations may actually be enhanced under privatiza-
tion because private prison guards are not protected by the official
immunity defense available to government employees.65
In the benefits administration context, serious potential
problems with the quality of services delivered are blamed on the
profit motive. However, because the private entity is merely ad-
ministering a benefits program designed through legislative and
agency action, democratic accountability issues are not significant
in such cases. A private company might be able to escape account-
ability for rule-like determinations, for example, if it creates rules
of thumb to apply to a class of cases. Such rules might be subject
to notice and comment or publication requirements if they were
made by a government agency.66 The short answer to this account-
ability problem is that private entities, in the contracting out situa-
64. The Supreme Court has not decided definitively whether private prison guards
and other private prison officials are state actors for the purposes of constitutional
duties and enforcement. However, it appears that they are. The Court has ruled that a
private doctor under contract to provide specialized medical care to inmates acted
under color of law when he allegedly exhibited deliberate indifference to an inmate's
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 57 (1988). In Atkins the Court reasoned that "[c]ontracting out prison medical
care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical
treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State's prisoners of the
means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights." Id. at 56. The same reasoning
applies to contracting out of custody itself.
65. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997).
66. The federal APA exempts rules on benefits from its notice and comment re-
quirements, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1994), but federal agencies are required to publish
their rules in the federal register. Id. § 552(a)(1)(D). Failure to publish a rule pre-
cludes it from being applied against a private party not having actual notice of the
rule. Id. § 552(a); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-33 (1974).
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tion, should not be making rules, but rather should be
administering rules made by the agency for which they act. The
private company may be more difficult to monitor and influence,
but the agency in charge of the program at issue should provide
sufficient political accountability for the program's administration.
Further, unlike government employees who may enjoy strong job
security, private contractors operate with the knowledge that they
always can be replaced, making them anxious to satisfy the agency
that employs them.
Due process is a serious concern in the privatization of govern-
ment institutions that affect private individuals. In some govern-
ment institutions, due process is a major issue. Prisons, schools,
and benefits administering agencies are all frequently required to
provide due process to people who wish to contest a decision such
as solitary confinement for a prison rule violation, suspension for
misbehavior in school, or lack of eligibility for a government bene-
fit.67 Privatization raises the question whether due process norms
that apply in government decision-making will apply to private in-
stitutions in contracting out situations. This is accountability writ
small since it is concerned with correctness and fairness in individ-
ual decisions, not with accountability to the body politic generally.
Arguably, due process norms should govern when privatization
substitutes a private company for a government agency in benefits
and similar matters. If a private entity is acting on behalf of a gov-
ernment agency, the same reasons for applying the government's
Eighth Amendment obligations regarding treatment of prisoners
should lead to the application of due process norms to private enti-
ties in contracting out situations. Nothing in the relationship be-
tween the agency supervising the private prison and the company
running the prison appears to provide a substitute incentive to
treat inmates fairly in procedural matters.
C. Deregulation, Cooperative Government, and Vouchers
Deregulation, cooperative government, and vouchers compose
the next category of privatization. It, too, encompasses a wide
range of government action, including deregulating personal mat-
ters such as marriage and similar relationships, deregulating indus-
tries such as utilities and transportation providers, cooperative and
marketized regulatory schemes, negotiated rulemaking, and shift-
67. Because the focus here is on entities that affect the public, I set aside claims by
workers to due process when a government employer takes adverse employment
action.
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ing from government provided goods and services to privately pro-
vided goods and services with government support to the
purchaser. The accountability implications of deregulation vary al-
most as widely as the forms of enterprises subject to possible der-
egulation. Cooperative government presents a problem of agency
capture and may make monitoring by the public more difficult.
Voucher systems are related to deregulation because they are
targeted at potentially reducing the government role in a particular
area, such as education or housing, or at least applying the disci-
pline of competition to government in the same way that deregula-
tion applies competition to regulated and protected industries.
1. Deregulation
a. Deregulation of Personal Relations
The accountability issues differ depending on the kind of deregu-
lation under consideration. I first consider deregulation of per-
sonal relations like marriage. Imagine deregulation of marriage,
with reduced government regulation of who is eligible to marry,
who can perform the ceremony, and what the legal incidents of the
relationship are.6 8 Note that in the United States marriage is some-
what deregulated compared to some other countries. In the
United States, private clergy and other private persons with gov-
ernment permission can perform legally binding marriages while in
some countries a civil service performed by a government official is
required.69 However, even with privatized performance of mar-
riage ceremonies, there are still strict limits on who can marry, and
there is still a great deal of regulation of the consequences of end-
ing marriages, especially when children are involved.7"
68. There is a great deal of scholarly debate over whether government should in-
crease, decrease, or maintain the current level of regulation of the marital relation-
ship. See generally Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family Change, GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2001) (reviewing JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS, THE
SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000)); Katharine B. Silbaugh, One Plus One
Makes Two, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 109 (2000) (reviewing MILTON C. REGAN JR., ALONE
TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE (1999)). Regan argues for rela-
tively strong regulation of marriage so that the law will express the positive values of
marriage. Id. at 109-10. Silbaugh argues that Regan's proposals would exacerbate gen-
der problems of marriage as currently practiced. Id. at 117-18.
69. For example, in Germany, a civil service is required and it must precede any
religious ceremony. See INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 254 (Werner F. Ebke &
Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996).
70. There have been constitutional challenges to some aspects of divorce regula-
tion. For example, there have been equal protection challenges to statutes that allow
courts to order divorced parents to pay for their childrens' postsecondary (college)
education when married parents are not so required. These challenges have been re-
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What might deregulated marriage mean? Bigamy might be le-
gal., and there are likely to be communities in which it would be
practiced, based on religious or cultural beliefs. Same-sex couples
also might enter into marriages. The incidents of marriage also
might become subject to free choice, whether by contract or by
some new form of agreement called marriage agreements.71 For
couples marrying within particular religious or cultural traditions,
form agreements might be developed within such communities to
provide the incidents of marriage.
From a privacy perspective, the whole idea of privatized mar-
riage would be to eliminate political accountability over the per-
sonal relationships involved, just as the Supreme Court has relied
on privacy notions to hold unconstitutional government regulation
of certain personal activities such as use of birth control 72 and
abortion.73 Deregulation of marriage is desirable from this per-
spective because people's decisions about intimate, private matters
should not be subject to control by the body politic.
Marriage has been deregulated somewhat in recent years in at
least a couple of important respects. First, courts are much more
willing to enforce antenuptual agreements.74 This allows the par-
ties, rather than the law, to specify some of the consequences of
divorce, most notably financial matters such as property division
and alimony. Second, the law has shifted from fault-based divorce
to no-fault divorce,75 which allows the parties, rather than the
courts, to decide when divorce is appropriate. These are significant
jected on the ground that the classification is reasonable in light of disadvantages
likely to be suffered by children of divorced parents. E.g., Childers v. Childers, 575
P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978); The Marriage of Kohring and Snodgrass, 999 S.W.2d 228 (Mo.
1999); see also L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 735 N.E.2d 359, 371 (Mass. 2000) (holding that (1)
even if noncustodial father disinherits minor child in will, court-ordered support obli-
gation survives his death; that (2) assets of the estate, including assets in an inter vivos
trust, may be reached to satisfy support obligation; and that (3) court may not posthu-
mously expand support obligation to include post-secondary educational expenses).
71. See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENY. U.
L. REV. 1235, 1249-50 (1996) (discussing possibility that allowing private agreements
could result in legal recognition of same-sex relationships). Some regulation based on
capacity to enter into the relationship such as age or mental illness might be retained
although others, based on factors such as gender or status as blood relation, might
not.
72. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93
Nw. U.L. REV. 65, 76 (1998).
75. Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspec-
tive, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 666-67 (1984).
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deregulatory moves that privatize an important part of decision-
making in the area of marriage.
More complete deregulation of marriage would raise a host of
substantive issues and questions about what legal regime would
govern absent what are now understood as the legal incidents of
marriage. Would contracts designed to take the place of marriage
be legally enforceable? Would courts scrutinize such agreements
for fairness, morality, and other public policy questions, including,
perhaps, whose agreements will be unenforceable due to violation
of public policies against such practices as multiple marriages and
same-sex marriages? How would courts protect vulnerable third
parties such as children born within privately agreed-upon relation-
ships? Would courts, in the course of deciding on the enforcement
of private agreements, create a set of common law doctrines to
take the place of law now understood as part of the regulation of
marriage? How would the tax system treat the income and assets
of the privately ordered relationships that would fill the gap left by
the absence of state-sanctioned marriages?7 6 Courts might slowly
but surely reinstitute marriage-like norms when they are called
upon to enforce privatized agreements.
Although deregulating marriage arguably would be liberating for
those who are disfavored under current law, the worry also has
been expressed that privatization of these relationships could exac-
erbate power inequities that the law ameliorates through its regula-
tion of the marriage relationship.77 The body politic might not
stand for giving up accountability for this type of conduct. Unless
government were somehow disabled from acting, the body politic's
reluctance to cede control of family relationships would likely
translate into regulation because the politicians with the power to
regulate would be held accountable for not regulating.
b. Deregulation of Markets
More commonly thought of under the deregulation rubric are
government decisions to allow more competition in an area of the
economy in which government regulation had previously limited
competition. Deregulation of previously regulated businesses can
76. Cf. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996); Nancy C.
Staudt, Taxation and Gendered Citizenship, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 533
(1997).
77. See Mary Becker, Sexuality: Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality,
73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1996) (allowing private bargaining in heterosexual
and same-sex relationships may ultimately result in "waiver of rights by the economi-
cally weaker party").
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reduce accountability, although the common fact that some sub-
stantial regulatory structure remains after deregulation tends to
preserve a measure of accountability.
In the United States, deregulation is probably the most common
form of privatization over the past couple of decades because the
public sector was much smaller in the United States than in other
developed countries. 78 In many countries, it was very common for
most or all utilities to be publicly owned.79 In those countries, two
stages of privatization were necessary: divestiture and then deregu-
lation. In the United States, while there has been substantial pub-
lic ownership of utilities, most energy and communications utilities
have long been privately owned within a strict regulatory system.80
Thus, the divestiture step was not necessary.
One prominent example of deregulation, long distance tele-
phone service, appears to have been very successful. Rates have
decreased and services available have expanded.8' Ratemaking in
this area is much less open to input in the public than it had been in
the past, since rates take effect in accordance with tariffs filed by
carriers without significant scrutiny from regulators.82 However,
the tariff filing system allows for at least a small measure of ac-
countability, which the Supreme Court apparently thought impor-
tant since it ruled that the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") lacked power under federal law to exempt nondominant
carriers (everyone but AT&T) from the tariff requirement.83
When competition is introduced into a previously regulated mar-
ket, consumer preferences (private) rather than regulatory stan-
dards (public) dominate price setting and the scope of goods or
services provided. This would appear to be a direct reduction of
political accountability, albeit in a trade-off for greater accountabil-
ity to the people as private citizens or market participants. Even if
private accountability increases more than the decrease in political
accountability (if such a comparison were possible) there may be
normative reasons for preferring political accountability. For ex-
78. Beermann, supra note 6, at 171.
79. Id.
80. See Beermann, supra note 6, at 171.
81. Kelly Hearn, Hold the Phone!, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR May 8, 2000, at 11
("Fierce competition, deregulation, and technological advances are reconfiguring the
telecommunications industry, driving down long-distance phone rates and giving con-
sumers a seemingly limitless-if sometimes baffling-array of service options .... ).
82. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (dis-
cussing the FCC's tariff scheme).
83. Id.
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ample, deregulation of an important service such as local telephone
service may, overall, increase the average person's degree of con-
trol over prices and services. However, it may decrease the ability
of a poor person or a person living in a remote area to afford ser-
vice. Political actors, in a situation of regulation, may require that
service be provided to those who could not afford it in the market.
Of course, to those favoring deregulation, the tendency of the
political system to distort market outcomes is the evil to be
avoided. Accountability through the political system means that
political power rather than the market determines important issues
of price and distribution. At a minimum, public choice analysis has
demonstrated that political power is not necessarily distributed
justly, and that the outcomes generated by the political process are
not necessarily good or just by any measure. 4 This does not really
answer the question as to whether the distribution that results from
a free market is fairer or more just, since the economic power to
have market influence also may not be justly distributed. The pub-
lic choice critique of the political process should not be taken too
far because it quickly can become a general attack on nearly all
government action. Nevertheless, it is a relevant consideration in
this particular context that should not be ignored.
In fact, regulation of prices and services can raise an interesting
accountability problem of its own that is related to the discussion
infra of decreased taxes and user fees. When, for example, a utili-
ties commission regulates rates in a way that results in cross-subsi-
dization of one market segment by another, or when government
action results in prices that vary from what a market would pro-
duce, accountability is less clear than if there were a tax imposed
on one group that was explicitly used to subsidize another group.
In effect, the government can use redistributive regulation to im-
pose a tax without including the tax in the government's budget,
and without the tax appearing clearly on any tax bill or return. Im-
agine a bill for local phone service that said: "Market Rate, $10.00;
Government Imposed Rate to Subsidize Rural Customers, $25.00."
Or imagine a price sticker on milk products that stated: "Market
Price, $1.50; Price Under Government Price Supports to Subsidize
Dairy Farmers, $3.00. "185 In fact, the FCC is aware of potential
84. See Macey, supra note 49, at 231-32 (describing how "laws that are enacted
will tend to benefit whichever small, cohesive special interest groups lobby most
effectively").
85. I mean to distinguish purely redistributive regulation from other regulation
such as health and safety regulation. Although health and safety regulation also may
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public resentment over government imposed costs and it has, in at
least one instance, prohibited communications service providers
from explicitly identifying fees as FCC imposed. 86 It would en-
hance political accountability if it were easier to know when prices
are artificially high because the government has decided to in-
crease a producer's income at consumers' expense or has decided
that one group of consumers should subsidize the consumption of
others.
In general, those in favor of deregulation have a strong account-
ability-based claim on their side, that in many circumstances the
market is less distorted than the political system. Overall account-
ability, in terms of responsiveness to popular will, is arguably
greater in the market than in the political system. Although there
are plenty of situations in which the market itself is suspect on both
efficiency and distributive justice grounds, there are certainly many
circumstances in which the only good explanations for regulation
lie in the political power of those who tend to benefit from regula-
tion. An analysis of the comparative advantages of highly regu-
lated versus relatively unregulated markets is beyond the scope of
raise prices to the general public, its goal is not to subsidize one group at the expense
of another. Rather, its goal is to increase overall social welfare. Of course, it is often
difficult to distinguish one category of legislation from the other, and skillful legisla-
tors can convince members of the public that redistributive legislation is actually for
their benefit. See Macey, supra note 49, at 232 & nn. 46-47 (discussing possibility that
environmental regulation actually subsidizes powerful interest groups). I recognize
that the distinction is not perfect and may ultimately collapse because there are many
situations in which regulation, such as health and safety regulation, is a hidden subsidy
to an interest group, such as the providers of health and safety products or services or
to the company in the market with a better product or service from the health and
safety perspective.
86. Under a program commonly referred to as "e-rate," legislation requires that
phone companies subsidize the use of the internet in public libraries and schools. The
FCC required phone companies to charge a fee to implement the subsidy but prohib-
ited phone companies from identifying the fee as FCC-imposed. Mike Krause, Secret
Tax on Your Telephone, INDEPENDENCE INST., May 2, 2000 ("You won't see a federal
e-rate tax on your phone bill because the Federal Communications Commission won't
allow it."), at http://www.i2i.org/SuptDocs/OpEdArcv/-2000/PhoneSubsidies.htm;
Kennard Outlines Plans for E-Rate Changes, COMMS. DAILY, June 11, 1998 ("Sen.
Ashcroft (R-Mo.) said e-rate program was tax that FCC attempted to keep 'hidden
from the American people.'"). The FCC's view was that carriers were misleading
their customers because although carriers were required to subsidize e-rate institu-
tions and also pay for other aspects of phone services through a portion of charges
collected, the method of funding the program was at the option of the carrier. There-
fore, it was misleading to characterize any fee added to the telephone bill as "FCC
mandated." First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, 14 FCC REC. 7492, FCC 99-72, CC Docket 98-170
51 (released May 11, 1999); see also Jon Van, Ameritech Takes Some of Mystery Out
of Bills, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1999, at 1 (referring to federal access charges).
1534
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
this article, but the issue certainly should be taken into account
when evaluating whether changes in the degree and nature of polit-
ical accountability due to deregulation are something to worry
about.
2. Cooperative Government
Another related set of phenomena that do not fit neatly into any
of our privatization categories, but which most closely resemble
deregulation, is what I call cooperative and market-based govern-
ance. This category includes regulatory strategies such as the move
away from command and control regulation to performance stan-
dards, marketization of regulation which combines performance
standards with tradable regulatory credits such as pollution credits,
cooperative regulatory strategies in which agencies work with the
regulated industries to develop optimal regulatory strategies, and
negotiated rulemaking. Each of these recent developments
presents interesting accountability considerations.
Moving from command and control regulation to performance-
based standards privatizes the decision of what constitutes the best
strategy for meeting regulatory requirements. The government no
longer chooses the only method of meeting the regulatory goal. It
is difficult to see any accountability concern here, apart from the
obvious agency concern that compliance with performance stan-
dards may be more difficult to monitor than command and control.
Marketization of regulation gives a company an incentive to im-
prove regulatory performance by allowing trading of credits earned
through regulatory compliance. For example, a power generating
company would be given an incentive to improve performance in
pollution control by being allowed to sell the right to pollute,
within limits set by the agency or by statute, when it reduces pollu-
tion below regulatory limits. To the extent trading is allowed, and
within the limits set by the agency or by statute, this privatizes the
decision of who will pollute and to what extent, when compared
with command and control regulation of each individual pollution
source. Again, monitoring difficulties are the most significant po-
litical accountability issue raised by this sort of regulatory reform.
Interests favoring stringent regulation are suspicious of reforms
aimed at reducing the command and control aspects of regulation
and allowing things like pollution credits to be bought and sold on
the market. These reforms are attacked as methods for reducing
the effectiveness of regulation by making it difficult to detect regu-
latory violations and eliminating the benefits of increased compli-
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ance.87 Insofar as it is difficult for the body politic to know
whether the proponents of stricter regulation are correct in their
charges, political accountability is made more difficult simply be-
cause obfuscation by those with political power is possible.
Cooperative regulatory strategies have been written about ex-
tensively by Jody Freeman.88 Under these programs, agencies
work closely with regulated parties to develop strategies to reach
regulatory goals. This cooperation, which occurs mainly at the en-
forcement stage, also may lead to better understanding of the goals
themselves, thus increasing the overall effectiveness of regulation.
Cooperative regulatory strategies allow for greater input by regu-
lated parties into agency enforcement activity, thus opening the
process to outside influence at least a bit. However, it may help to
further shut out interested third parties, who already may find it
very difficult to have influence at the enforcement stage.
Negotiated rulemaking allows the agency, regulated parties, and
interested third parties to negotiate together before the agency set-
tles on a rulemaking proposal. The negotiation precedes the nor-
mal notice and comment process that most agency rules must go
through to become law. The aims of negotiated rulemaking are:
(1) to improve rules by getting input from all sides in a better for-
mat than comments on proposed rules; (2) to make post-rulemak-
ing challenges less likely because most, if not all, interested parties
have agreed to the rules in advance; and (3) to ease enforcement
by making cooperation post-rulemaking more likely. From an ac-
countability standpoint, there is some concern that the negotiations
simply will degenerate into horse trading among interested parties
who may ignore the overall public interest. Accountability is pro-
tected by Congress's rejection of proposals for secrecy in the Nego-
tiated Rulemaking Act, and the requirement that negotiated rules
still go through the notice and comment process, but the negotia-
tion process still may excite suspicion from those not involved in
the negotiations. 89
87. See generally Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regula-
tion?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 104-15 (2001) (describing and evaluating new regulatory
strategies).
88. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543 (2000); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
89. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994); RONALD A.
CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 579-80 (3d ed. 1998)
(offering a description of the secrecy proposal and Congress's rejection of it).
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With all regulatory programs that increase cooperation between
interested parties and government, especially those focused only
on the relationship between government and the regulated parties,
there is a danger of agency capture. Too much cooperation be-
tween government and regulated parties could lead to unhealthy
relationships in which both regulated parties and government offi-
cials gain at the expense of the public interest. Programs that in-
crease the complexity of monitoring for regulatory compliance
present the same danger, although government officials also could
use uncertainty as an excuse for even stricter regulation if that
would result in gains to those officials. Thus, although the positive
potential in the reforms outlined above is clear, concerns for politi-
cal accountability should lead, at least, to caution.
3. Vouchers
Vouchers present interesting political accountability issues. The
most widely discussed voucher issue over the past several years is
education, in which a strong movement advocates giving parents of
school-aged children vouchers they can use toward tuition at either
public or private schools.90 The idea would be to create more of a
market in elementary and secondary education, because vouchers
would enable more people to afford private education.
There is a perception that at least some public school systems,
not facing much in the way of market competition, spend inordi-
nate amounts of money on administration and neglect education. 9'
Further, public schools may be hampered by powerful teachers un-
ions that bargain for seniority systems and work rules that reduce
flexibility in ways that harm education.92 Of course, teachers may
tell a different story, blaming the failings of public schools on over-
crowded classrooms, inadequate support, and social problems in
the communities they serve. These two sets of factors, combined
with tax reduction movements that have left schools with what they
claim is inadequate funding to keep pace with the changing educa-
tional needs of public school students, have made public schools a
90. David Boaz, CATO Inst., Let the Children Go, Mar. 22, 1999 (defining
voucher plans), http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-22-99.html.
91. See, e.g., Meredith May & Janine DeFao, Oakland Team on Education Wraps
Up Proposals, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 1999, at A21 (discussing school reform proposals
in Oakland).
92. See, e.g., Brian McGrory, Kerry Set to Propose Ending Tenure System, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 16, 1998, at Al (discussing proposal to end teacher tenure system in
public schools that is part of school system's contract with teachers unions).
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prime target for privatization advocates. Tuition vouchers are a
method for accomplishing that privatization. Voucher advocates
argue that were public schools forced to compete for students, they
either would have to perform to the standard of private competi-
tors, or they would wither away. There always has been some com-
petition with private schools for students, but the public schools
cost much less and are the only affordable choice for some
students.
Tuition vouchers in primary and secondary education in all likeli-
hood would lead to greater privatization, because at the margin
more people could afford and would choose private schools. The
arguments over these vouchers are similar to arguments concern-
ing privatization in other contexts. For example, in addition to in-
terests representing poorer parents who are concerned that the
public schools will lose support in a voucher system, the biggest
interest group that has opposed vouchers is teachers who fear the
consequences vouchers will have on their jobs and working condi-
tions.94 Interests concerned about supporting religious education
with public funds also have opposed tuition vouchers because
many private schools are religious and would not be subject to the
prohibition on religious education that exists for public schools.95
Private schools, like other private entities, may not pay as much as
public schools and may not provide the highly rule-bound, struc-
tured work environment that public schools provide. Even with
similar laws in place, there is a perception that labor laws and con-
tracts are not enforced with the same zeal in the private sector as
they are in the public sector.96
Tuition vouchers are viewed as a method for improving the pub-
lic schools because, for lack of competition or some other reason or
combination of reasons, the traditional lines of government ac-
countability have not succeeded in a significant number of public
schools in maintaining high quality programs. In many jurisdic-
93. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, 4 Companies Emerge in Bid to Privatize Worst
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at B8 (discussing for-profit companies taking over
public schools).
94. See generally, Press Statement, Statement of UFT President Randi Wein-
garten, United Federation of Teachers (Aug. 28, 2000) (arguing that vouchers are a
poor solution to the problems facing public schools), http://www.uft.org/
news.cfm?doc id=1200.
95. See David Webber, Editorial, Public Funding for Religious Schooling is a Part
of America's Past, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 2000, at D9 ("A frequent argu-
ment of opponents is that establishing tuition vouchers amounts to aiding religion and
is, therefore, unconstitutional.").
96. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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tions, management of the schools is overseen by an independently
elected school board, which acts like a board of directors and hires
a superintendent, who acts like a chief executive officer.
Private schools receiving government funded tuition vouchers
would be more difficult to control through the political system than
public schools. However, it is likely that governments giving
vouchers would impose substantive and reporting requirements on
private schools accepting vouchers. School board, and thus politi-
cal, control over school curricula and other program details would
be reduced, as of course would political control over other struc-
tural and labor matters. The body politic would have to decide
whether political accountability is worth losing in favor of in-
creased market accountability that might lead to better quality and,
ultimately, more responsiveness to the popular will.
Vouchers have been used widely in other government benefits
contexts, sometimes with a privatization connection and sometimes
without. There are at least three prominent voucher programs in
the welfare area: Food Stamps, WIC coupons, and Section 8 hous-
ing vouchers. 97 Recipients of Food Stamps and WIC coupons must
use them to purchase food.98 Section 8 vouchers require benefits
recipients to use the vouchers for housing.99 Although there is no
great tradition in this country of direct government provision of
food to benefits recipients, there has been and still is plenty of pub-
lic housing in this country. Thus, the Section 8 voucher program
can be viewed as a privatized system of public housing, in which
government pays the rent, but private, regulated, landlords provide
the housing.
Contrary to the freedom-enhancing intent of tuition voucher
programs, welfare vouchers are an attempt to retain political ac-
countability over the welfare recipient's use of benefits. Vouchers,
as opposed to pure cash grants, are designed to increase accounta-
bility and decrease private decision-making. The welfare recipient
must use a portion of the benefits exclusively for food or housing.
It is usually a crime to use such vouchers for other purposes or to
trade them for cash. 100 Food Stamps and WIC coupons come with
tight controls over the kinds of foods that can be purchased. Gov-
97. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2032 (1994) (establishing Food Stamps program); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1786 (1994) (creating WIC (women, infants, and children) program); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(o) (authorizing Section 8 housing program).
98. 7 U.S.C. § 2016; 42 U.S.C. § 1786.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o).
100. See 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1994).
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ernment agencies control even minor details, such as whether a
WIC coupon can be used to purchase flavored milk or only un-
flavored milk.1"1 In situations in which direct government provi-
sion of a good or service is not a realistic or likely alternative, a
voucher increases political accountability by giving government
control over choices made by private individuals.
Although political accountability may help explain welfare
vouchers for food, the political realities may not appear all that
positive. For one, the paternalistic impulse that leads to restric-
tions on the use of welfare creates the image of a "Big Brother"
government making sure that people spend their welfare in the
grocery store and not the liquor store. Further, the politics of wel-
fare are quite interesting. Public choice scholars sometimes have
difficulty explaining why welfare programs for poor people are en-
acted, since the poor do not appear to be obvious candidates for
having the ability to organize and the power to influence govern-
ment. They may be numerous enough to carry voting power in
some jurisdictions, but they often are not as likely to vote as their
wealthier counterparts. However, the existence of organized inter-
ests in the food production industries may explain the existence of
the Food Stamp and WIC voucher programs. The Food Stamp
program, for example, is administered by the Department of Agri-
culture, not Health and Human Services-the agency one would
think would have primary jurisdiction over welfare programs. 102
Although any welfare program for the poor is likely to increase
spending on food, vouchers that are restricted to food purchases
ensure that a certain amount of government money goes toward
food rather than other possible uses that welfare recipients might
prefer.
Housing vouchers function more like tuition vouchers because
they rely on a private alternative even though a government insti-
tution providing the same service may exist. One reason for the
existence of housing vouchers is that the supply of publicly owned
low income housing is inadequate. Public housing, in some places,
has suffered from problems that plague government attempts to
provide goods or services without real competition or sufficient ac-
countability for managers-mismanagement, inflated costs, and
101. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985) (addressing
procedural validity of rulemaking process that resulted in removal of flavored milk
from the list of permissible foods for the WIC program).
102. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(l) (1994) (defining "secretary" as used in statute to be the
Secretary of Agriculture).
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corruption. 10 3 Housing vouchers allow housing benefit recipients
to live in privately owned housing where landlords may be in com-
petition for tenants. However, this competition may be more theo-
retical than real, because the need for housing benefits may be due
to an inordinately tight or expensive private housing market; The
problems of quality and supply that exist for voucher tenants may
be similar to problems suffered in the purely private market, espe-
cially by tenants at the lower end of the economic spectrum. Public
housing may suffer from poor management common to govern-
ment-run institutions where market discipline is lacking and ac-
countability to the public is not nearly as strong as private
accountability to shareholders. If political accountability is not suf-
ficient to ensure high quality public housing at a reasonable cost,
then perhaps market competition, in the form of vouchers, could
help.
D. Tax Reductions and User Fees
Cass's final category of privatization is tax reductions and user
fees, both allowing private parties more choice about the use of
money than if taxes were not reduced or if user fees were not im-
posed. Tax reductions are the bluntest form of privatization since
they involve decreasing the share of the economy captured by the
government without regard to the particular programs that would
be cut or the particular uses to which the money would be put.
User fees privatize decision-making in that they permit private par-
ties to decide how much of a government good or service to use
(and thus how much should be provided) based on whether the
good or service is worth the cost imposed by the user fee.
1. Tax Reductions
There may be nothing original to be said about tax reductions
and political accountability. Obviously, the ability of the political
system to influence the use of money is reduced if taxes are re-
duced. The whole point of a tax reduction is to take consumption
decisions away from government and put them in private hands. A
person enjoying a tax reduction is unlikely to complain that she has
lost the ability to politically control the use of her money since she
has been given complete direct control.
103. See generally Don Terry, Former Housing Chief Blames Woes on Feds, SAN
DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Aug. 6, 1995, at H15; Serge F. Kovaleski, D.C. May Write Off
More Rents; Housing Agency's Losses Would Grow by $5.8 Million, WASH. POST, May
15, 1994, at Al.
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This does not mean, of course, that no one opposes tax de-
creases. A heavy consumer of government services, such as a par-
ent of school aged children or a daily user of public mass transit,
may fear that a tax decrease will lead to lowered government ser-
vices and thus would prefer to pay higher taxes to support those
programs. The poor may approve of increased taxes on the rich.
Putting ideological preferences aside, one would expect opposition
to tax decreases when it is someone else's taxes that are being de-
creased or when the gain from the tax decrease is perceived as less
than the loss from reduced services.
One political accountability matter that can be raised by the
overall level of taxation is the problem of overspending. There
have been periods of deficit spending by government in which, in
effect, the current generation finances consumption through bor-
rowing that appears likely to be paid off only by future genera-
tions. A tax reduction could be a rational decision by current
taxpayers to reduce their share at the expense of future taxpayers.
However, it may be that the borrowing is for long-term capital
projects that will benefit future generations, and borrowing also
could strengthen the economy in ways that will benefit future gen-
erations albeit less tangibly than would capital projects. Nonethe-
less, it is not an original observation to point out that the inability
of future generations to influence today's political decisions can
skew decision-making against the interests of future generations.
There are factors that ameliorate this problem. The size of the
deficit became, in recent times, a political issue to current taxpay-
ers, perhaps because it got so big that government interest pay-
ments hampered flexibility in government spending, and higher
market interest rates caused by government borrowing were hurt-
ing current taxpayers.0 4 Perhaps current taxpayers recognized
that consumption at the expense of future generations was morally
questionable. While President Clinton expressed concern over
eliminating the deficit too quickly, he was happy to take credit
when a strong economy led to surpluses in federal funds rather
than deficits.1"5 It remains to be seen whether deficits will return
when the economy sours or whether political concern over deficits
104. See, e.g., Eamonn Fingleton, Unsustainable, 11 AM. PROSPECT 1821 (2000).
105. See Richard Rahn, Who Gave Us the Surplus, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at
A14 (discussing President Clinton taking credit for the surplus); Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents 1139, 95 WL 15155290, July 3, 1995 (Speech by President
Clinton cautioning against too rapid reduction of deficit).
1542
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
hinders borrowing for long-term capital projects the cost of which
ought to be shared by future generations.
2. User Fees
User fees are a fascinating subject for study, because they can
raise fundamental issues about the role of government. User fees
are ubiquitous, and most are accepted without much thought. We
pay for our driver's licenses, our passports, licenses for our pets,
postage stamps, fares for government-owned mass transit, copies of
birth, marriage, and death certificates, and numerous other govern-
ment goods and services. Some fees are very controversial, and it
is interesting to contemplate the appropriate circumstances for im-
posing user fees, as opposed to providing government services
without charge.
User fees tend to privatize the decision of whether government
should provide a particular good or service because the good or
service will not be provided unless it is worth it to the consumer to
pay the user fee. °6 This is often preferable to general taxation and
use of government funds to provide goods and services without
user fees, especially where the beneficiaries of the goods or ser-
vices are users who can afford a fee and who might choose alterna-
tives if they were forced to pay.
User fees are thought to introduce a measure of efficiency into
the operation of government, because, assuming some measure of
accuracy in pricing, they ensure that government goods and ser-
vices are not overconsumed simply because they are available for
free or at too low a price. Although efficient pricing is a laudable
goal, some user fees appear to be imposed simply because govern-
ment can do so and the group upon whom the fee is imposed can-
not use the political process to resist them. For example,
defendants in criminal cases are often assessed court costs as part
of the disposition of their cases. The Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service imposes user fees for entering the United States and
for other services it provides, °7 and user fees in the form of higher
telephone rates are imposed by some states on calls by prisoners.10 8
106. This description of user fees as privatizing choice is drawn from Cass, supra
note 8, at 461.
107. See 8 C.F.R § 103.7 (2000). For a schedule of fees in table form, see Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv., Forms and Fees, at http://www.ins.gov/-graphics/form-
sfee/forms/index.htm (last modified Mar 14, 2001).
108. Collect calls made from prisons are charged at a higher rate than other collect
calls, with the telephone company and the government sharing the extra revenue. See
Jeremy Kohler, Boycott Highlights High Fees Paid By Inmates' Families for Long Dis-
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The groups on whom these fees are assessed may have difficulty
organizing against them within the political process. 0 9 It is unclear
whether these fees are motivated by a desire to rationalize con-
sumption or are simply revenue raising measures where there ap-
pears to be an easy source of revenue.
Consider further examples of user fees. Public schools do not
charge tuition for residents of the school district, although they
may accept tuition-paying students from outside the district, and
they often charge user fees for extracurricular activities such as
sports teams, drama groups, and the like. Municipally-owned rec-
reational facilities, such as golf courses, swimming pools, and
beaches charge user fees, though other recreational facilities, such
as parks, do not. Some targeted taxes, such as the excise tax on
gasoline, are more accurately thought of as user fees since they are
earmarked for highway funding. Highway tolls are also user fees.
Although it may be very efficient to target the users of a particular
road for the costs of building and maintaining the road, the trans-
action costs of imposing tolls may not be worth the gains in
efficiency.110
User fees potentially are subject to abuse. User fees may be im-
plemented in order to impose cross-subsidization; rates are some-
times set in regulated industries in which uniform rates often result
in subsidies to customers whose service is relatively expensive to
tance Calls: Missouri Will End Payments to State in Next Contract, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH, Aug. 11, 2000, at Al; Cathy Woodruff, Vote Set for Jail Phone Contract,
TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Sept. 6, 2000, at B1 (describing $1.30 surcharge on
county jail inmates' collect calls which funds a forty-nine percent commission on calls
that goes to county; county claims that the surcharge and commission do not affect
the rates charged).
109. An organization, Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants, organized
a month-long national boycott of prison phones with surcharges, and the boycott ap-
parently helped convince at least the Missouri legislature to end the practice. Kohler,
supra note 108. The organization continues to campaign against surcharges on inmate
telephone calls. See Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants, Prisoners' Tele-
phone Charges, at http://www.curenational.org/Position/curepo9.html.
110. Stopping for tolls causes pollution, wastes time and fuel, and can be danger-
ous. For example, Connecticut removed the tolls from the Connecticut turnpike after
a widely publicized fatal accident in which "a tractor-trailer slammed into a line of
cars, killing seven people." Pat R. Gilbert, Drivers May Pay a Price to Lose Tolls:
More Traffic, Crashes and Trucks are Feared, REC. (Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 26,
1992, at Al. Further, when only some roads are toll roads, choices get distorted and
people choose less desirable roads to avoid tolls, thus causing overcrowding on non-
toll roads and under-utilization (from a purely traffic perspective) of toll roads. When
tolls are removed, traffic increases, prompting fear of congestion and accidents, which
appears to contradict the accident-reducing motivation for removing tolls in some
cases. Id.
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provide. The best example of this may be postal rates. It has long
been argued by competitors of the United States Postal Service
that first class postal rates are set at a level that far exceeds the
average cost of delivering first class mail.11 The surplus from first
class postage is used, it is argued, to subsidize other services pro-
vided by the Postal Service such as parcel post and express mail 1 2
and even non-postal products and services.1 1 3 Unlike first class
mail, over which the Postal Service has a monopoly, the Postal Ser-
vice competes with private companies in other areas, and the com-
panies complain that this renders the competition in areas where
the Postal Service has surrendered its monopoly unfair.'1 4 There is
also a suggestion that the Postal Service uses some of the first class
surplus to subsidize what many call junk mail, i.e., mail consisting
of catalogs and sales offers. It may be socially desirable to subsi-
dize such mailings, for the positive effects on commerce and com-
munication. However, it is not at all clear that it makes sense to do
this at the expense of first class mailers, as opposed to taxpayers
generally. Although the high price of first class mail gives incen-
111. See Joseph W. Belluck, Note, Increasing Citizen Participation in U.S. Postal
Service Policy Making: A Model Act to Create a Post Office Consumer Action Group,
42 BuFF. L. REV. 253, 254-55 (1994) (arguing that the average consumer pays inflated
first class rates and receives poor service because commercial mailers and postal un-
ions exert undue influence in the rate setting process). The Postal Rate Commission is
required by statute to set postal rates for each class of mail to recover the costs of
handling that class of mail. See 39 U.S.C. § 3622 (1994). There is often controversy
over the allocation of these costs. Nat'l Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 833-34 (1983).
112. Mark Murray, No Stamp of Approval for Postal Reform, NAT'L J., Jan. 30,
1999, at 277 ("But many Postal Service competitors, such as Federal Express and
UPS, have . . . complained for years that the Postal Service uses its billion-dollar
monopoly of first-class mail to subsidize express mail, parcel post, and other services
that compete with the services that private firms offer.").
113. Timothy Roche et al., Who's Got Mail?, TIME, Oct. 16, 2000, at 86 ("For years
the Postal Service has been accused of using profits from its monopolistic first-class
deliveries to subsidize loss-leading services such as prepaid phone cards that compete
with private companies.").
114. The claim of subsidy is controversial because determining the proper market
rate for first class mail is not a simple task. The Postal Service may enjoy a competi-
tive advantage merely because the equipment and labor necessary to handle first class
mail may, to an extent, reduce the marginal cost of providing other services. Forcing
the Postal Service to include some of that equipment in its cost calculations for other
services might result in unfairly increasing prices for other services and decreasing
prices for first class mail, which might in turn unfairly disadvantage firms competing
around the edges of the first class monopoly, such as messengers and other delivery
services, fax machine manufacturers, and email equipment and service providers.
Thus, the claim of subsidy, although intuitively attractive, may be more complex than
it appears at first glance.
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tives to find alternatives, such as faxing and email, the monopoly
frustrates substitution at least to some extent.
I do not mean to suggest that third party effects should not be
considered when user fees are imposed or set. Although some pay-
ers of user fees easily may be able to spread the costs to third par-
ties enjoying benefits, there may be social benefits that can be
more easily spread through a tax system than a system of user fees.
For example, it may be that all local residents and businesses bene-
fit from the existence of roads and mass transit, even if they do not
use the roads or transit system themselves. Although it makes
sense for users to pay part of the costs (through tolls, gasoline
taxes, and fares) it may not make sense to attempt to collect all, or
even nearly all, the costs through user fees if the users cannot
spread the costs of the fees to other beneficiaries. Insofar as soci-
ety benefits generally, it makes sense to finance an activity through
more general taxes. For example, an argument against imposition
of user fees on primary and secondary education is that there are
significant third party benefits when the work force is educated,
and it would be difficult for workers to recoup their educational
costs from their employers, who would then recover the costs from
customers.
It is unclear how user fees affect political accountability. Be-
cause government activities are, almost by definition, subject to ac-
countability through the political process, whether those activities
include user fees should not normally have large effects on political
accountability. In some situations, financing government activities
through user fees on consumers of government goods or services
rather than through general revenues may help remedy a common
problem of political accountability. The general public usually has
little incentive to pay attention to what a large government like the
United States government is doing with general revenues because
the taxes paid by any particular person are unlikely to be affected
even if unrest by taxpayers completely eliminated a government
good or service. Beneficiaries, on the other hand, may have a
strong incentive to lobby for a benefit, and if the beneficiaries are a
small and cohesive group, they may succeed without regard to
whether the benefit is politically acceptable generally or socially
desirable.' 15 Even though some oversight, for example by a legisla-
tive committee, is theoretically possible, without anyone with an
115. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)
(describing characteristics of groups that are likely to be able to organize and procure
benefits through the political process).
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incentive to complain, under many circumstances it is unlikely that
the political process effectively will check government provision of
benefits. 16 With user fees financing all or some of the provision of
the government good or service, this element of political distortion
is less of a problem.
User fees also can provide accountability by applying a measure
of market discipline to government. If a governmental unit is re-
quired to finance its activities through user fees, and if there is
competition or substitutes, the fees will be constrained by the price
at which alternatives are available. The performance of the gov-
ernmental unit can be judged by its ability to attract business and
finance its activities with the fees imposed.
The imposition of user fees also may increase users' incentives to
monitor government's performance. It may be that when a service
is paid for the user feels a greater entitlement to competent, effec-
tive government than when a service appears free of charge. Since
most people must realize that even "free" services are paid for
through taxes, this should not be a great effect, but when user fees
mimic payment for a good or service in the market, the effect may
exist.
E. Government Corporations
The last form of privatization I discuss involves entities that are
difficult to classify as either public or private. There are numerous
government corporations performing various functions in which
the lines of accountability are very unclear and the status of the
entity as governmental or private is highly uncertain. Michael
Froomkin has written an extensive article on this subject,117 and I
do not mean to repeat his analysis here, but I hope to shed some
light on the issue from a privatization and political accountability
perspective. If agencies are a headless fourth branch of govern-
ment, then perhaps federal government corporations are a fifth.
I suspect that most people have heard of at least a few federal
government corporations, such as Amtrak, Fannie Mae, Ginnie
Mae, Freddie Mac, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting, the Legal Services Corporation, and
one that has been in the news recently due to President Bush's
focus on faith-based organizations, the Corporation for National
116. This is the public choice dilemma.
117. See Froomkin, supra note 9 (analyzing federal government corporations and
their character as both public and private entities).
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and Community Service.1 18 These are corporations owned wholly
or in part by the federal government.
For some reason or set of reasons, the federal government has
found it desirable to conduct some of its business in the corporate
form." 9 Perhaps the corporate form is more convenient when the
government participates in financial or other markets. Perhaps the
corporate form allows federal expenditures to not appear on the
federal budget, or shields funds of the government corporation
from potential use by other government agencies. However, the
government's use of the corporate form raises questions. Are
there limits to the choice of the corporate form? To return to an
earlier example, 2 ' is there any reason why, assuming the Appoint-
ments Clause and other concerns were met, the federal govern-
ment could not create EPA, Inc., a government corporation, to
administer federal environmental law?
When the federal government sells goods or services on the mar-
ket, the corporate form may be desirable, especially if there is a
possibility that the corporate entity might someday be privatized.
Amtrak, the common name for the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation, was established by federal legislation as a for-profit
corporation under the District of Columbia's corporate law.121
Congress explicitly provided that Amtrak is not an agency or estab-
lishment of the federal government. However, by statute the Presi-
dent appoints six members of Amtrak's board of directors, and
because of ongoing government subsidies, the secretary of trans-
portation appoints two board members.1 22 The final board mem-
ber is appointed by the other eight.123 If Amtrak were to become
profitable and no longer need government subsidies, perhaps the
federal government would sell its stock in Amtrak. The corporate
118. Although the corporation's official name is the Corporation for National and
Community Service, it commonly uses a shortened version, the Corporation for Na-
tional Service. E.g., Corporation for National Service, at http://www.cns.gov.
119. See Froomkin, supra note 9, at 557-59 (discussing reasons that government
forms government corporations).
120. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
121. Beermann, supra note 6, at 177.
122. Id.
123. Id. Appointments Clause issues with regard to the appointment of Amtrak's
board members are similar to those raised above, supra Part I.A. If Amtrak is not a
government entity, it is unclear what constitutional provision authorizes appointment
by the President or the Secretary of Transportation. On the other hand, if the board
members are officers of the United States, then there is no authority for appointment
of the final director by the other eight, because Amtrak is unlikely to be considered a
department of government and the directors are thus not likely to be considered
heads of a department.
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form would ease Amtrak's transformation into" a purely private
entity.
Government corporations also are used commonly in financial
matters, such as facilitating home mortgage financing. Although
several federal government corporations are involved in this mar-
ket, I focus here on the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion, commonly known as Freddie Mac. 124 Freddie Mac purchases
home mortgages, pools them, and securitizes them, selling shares in
the pools on the open market.125 This helps finance home mort-
gages, since mortgagees can sell the mortgages and use the funds
from the sales to write more mortgage loans.
Freddie Mac was established by federal statute to advance the
federal government's interests in a stabile secondary market for
home mortgages and to further the availability of mortgage financ-
ing, including for low and moderate income housing.126 In addition
to establishing Freddie Mac as a corporation, Congress statutorily
prescribed Freddie Mac's powers, granted Freddie Mac immunity
from state and local taxation (except for real property taxes), and
provided that for purposes of federal court jurisdiction, Freddie
Mac should be considered a federal agency and all cases to which
Freddie Mac is a party are deemed to arise under federal law. 2 7
Freddie Mac functions largely like a private corporation. It has
issued stock to the public, and Freddie Mac stock is traded on the
New York Stock Exchange under the symbol FRE. It has, how-
ever, a continuing connection to the federal government. Its board
of directors has eighteen members, five of which are appointed by
the President, apparently without the advice and consent of the
Senate. 2 8 Further, the statute creating Freddie Mac grants the
President the power to remove the directors he appoints "for good
cause. "129
Arguably, the President should not have the sole power to ap-
point or remove Freddie Mac directors unless they are inferior of-
ficers of the United States. 3 ° They cannot be principal officers
124. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-59 (1994).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 1451 note (Short Title and Statement of Purpose).
127. Id. § 1452(f).
128. Id. § 1452(a).
129. Id. § 1452(a)(2)(B).
130. As Professor Michael Froomkin points out, the Supreme Court has long ap-
proved presidential appointment of directors to private corporations in which the gov-
ernment has an interest. Froomkin, supra note 9, at 574 n.156 (discussing the Court's
longstanding approval of presidential appointments of directors of the Bank of the
United States).
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because then senatorial confirmation would be required. 31 If the
directors are not officers, it is difficult to imagine what power the
President would have to appoint them. Removal is even trickier. I
find it very suspicious for the President to have the power to re-
move a director of a private company. It is not a question of the
President stepping on the toes of another branch of government,
which is often an issue in separation of powers questions, but
rather a question of ultra vires, i.e., whether the President has the
power to appoint and remove directors of federally chartered pri-
vate corporations.
Perhaps strong evidence that the President has such power lies in
historical evidence, dating to entities like the Bank of the United
States and even back to the colonial period in which the King of
England appointed colonial officials who governed the colonies by
heading up what may be best characterized as government corpo-
rations. 132 Because questions like what powers are included as
proper Presidential powers are difficult to answer conceptually,
historical practice is often a good guide on what powers were
granted in the Constitution. If historically the President and even
the King of England have made appointments to government cor-
porations, or privately owned corporations chartered to perform
government functions, then perhaps the executive power granted
in the Constitution should be understood to continue the tradition.
Interestingly, the courts have not been sympathetic to arguments
that Freddie Mac is a government agency, at least when the issue is
whether Freddie Mac is subject to constraints on government ac-
tion. The Ninth Circuit has held that Freddie Mac is not a govern-
ment entity for the purposes of applying the Due Process Clause to
Freddie Mac's dealings with sellers and servicers of mortgage
loans. 3 3 The court relied primarily on the fact that the President
could appoint only a minority of Freddie Mac's directors, which
was insufficient to give the federal government control over Fred-
die Mac.'34 The court distinguished Freddie Mac from Amtrak,'35
131. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
132. The first Congress created at least one government corporation, the Bank of
the United States. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (discuss-
ing constitutionality of Bank of the United States). It may be, although I am not
certain, that entities like the Massachusetts Bay Colony are even earlier examples of
government corporations, private companies exercising powers, some of which may
have been governmental in nature, granted by the sovereign.
133. See Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d
1401, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996).
134. Id. at 1407.
135. Id. at 1407-08.
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which the Supreme Court held to be a state actor for First Amend-
ment purposes because all but one of Amtrak's board members are
appointed by federal government officials.136 The Seventh Circuit
denied a claim against Freddie Mac under the Federal Tort Claims
Act 37 on the ground that Freddie Mac is not an agency of the fed-
eral government, 38 although it did hold that Freddie Mac was pro-
tected from estoppel under doctrines that hold government
agencies not subject to estoppel by the representations of their
agents. 139
The structure and ownership of federal government corporations
varies widely. On one extreme, the Corporation for National and
Community Service, from an accountability standpoint, appears to
be indistinguishable from a government agency except that it is in
the corporate form. 140 The structure and powers of the corporation
are prescribed by legislation, and the directors and CEO of the cor-
poration are appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. 141 The corporation's directors and CEO must
be legally considered "Officers of the United States" or the Sen-
ate's role in confirming appointments would be subject to constitu-
tional challenge because the only basis for senatorial action
without bicameralism and presentment is the Senate's constitu-
tional role in confirming the appointments of such officers. 42 Uni-
lateral action by the Senate with effects outside the Senate itself is
unconstitutional unless specifically authorized by the
Constitution. 14 3
The legal and constitutional status of other federal government
corporations is not so clear. For example, the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem has a great deal of power over monetary policy in the United
States. The system is a mixture of what look like government agen-
cies (the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate) and private entities (the directors of the
Federal Reserve Banks are chosen by member banks, which also
136. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
137. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994).
138. See Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1992).
139. Id. at 1139.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 12651 (1994) (establishing the Corporation for National and
Community Service). Interestingly, the term "Executive Agency" is defined in the
United States Code to include "an Executive Department, a Government corpora-
tion, and an independent establishment." 5 U.S.C. § 105 (1994).
141. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12651c, 12651e (2001).
142. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
143. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983).
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own shares in the Federal Reserve Banks). 1 4 Membership on the
Federal Open Market Committee, an important committee in set-
ting monetary policy, is selected in part by the Boards of the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks, which in effect means that private entities are
choosing members of what looks like a government body. 145 This
arrangement raises grave doubts under the Appointments
Clause 146 and perhaps also under nondelegation doctrine princi-
ples. If the members of the committee are officers of the United
States, they can be selected only in compliance with the Appoint-
ments Clause which would not allow appointment by private enti-
ties such as banks. If they are not officers of the United States,
then the appointment of some members by the President with sen-
atorial confirmation, even indirectly by virtue of their service on
the Board of Governors, is subject to constitutional attack as, at a
minimum, beyond the Senate's confirmation power. Nondelega-
tion principles also call into question allowing an entity that is at
least partly privately controlled to decide important matters of fed-
eral government policy.
Regardless of the legal issues raised by these sorts of arrange-
ments, the appearance and reality of political accountability are
placed in doubt when government power is wielded by entities that
are either outside government or only loosely connected to govern-
ment.1 47 The Federal Reserve System may be the best example of
this, because in recent years the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
System, Alan Greenspan, has appeared to function independently
of the rest of government, steering the economy away from the
depths of recession and the shoals of inflation. The Chairman is
appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, so perhaps his
perceived lack of accountability is a function of the independence
of his agency and his insulation from Presidential removal, but the
structure of the Federal Reserve System, with its public/private
144. 12 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
145. Five of the twelve members of the committee are selected by the Federal Re-
serve Banks. The other committee members are the Members of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, who are appointed by the president and
confirmed by the Senate. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1994).
146. See Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that equitable discretion counsels against hearing United States Senator's
challenge to appointment by Federal Reserve Banks of members of the Federal Open
Market Committee).
147. See, e.g., Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 521 (D.D.C.
1986) (stating that selection of members of Federal Reserve Board's Federal Open
Market Committee by private individuals did not violate Appointments Clause), affd
in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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partnership appears to have at least something to do with the
Chairman's unique status in the political system.
Whatever their virtues, government corporations appear to cre-
ate significant questions of accountability. Their connection to
government can be mysterious, and their loyalties mixed if both
government and shareholders participate in their governance by
choosing directors and officers. A public unhappy, for example,
with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae is likely to have no idea whom to
hold responsible. It may not even be obvious who is making which
decisions. The inability to assign political responsibility for the ac-
tions of government corporations is often likely to be much greater
than that caused by commandeering of state and local government
by the federal government. Yet we have no developed vocabulary
for discussing whether a particular function is appropriate for the
corporate form or whether it should be performed, if at all, by an
actual government agency.
III. FOIA AND THE APA
The last set of issues I look at involve the applicability of the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")' 4 8 and related statutes 149
and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 150 to the activities
of entities involved in privatization. Recall that the three criteria
for political accountability put forward at the outset of this article
are: (1) the body politic's ability to influence a governmental deci-
sion, (2) the body politic's ability to know which entity in the politi-
cal system is responsible for an action or policy, and (3) the ability
of the body politic to obtain information about a decision or action.
Application of FOIA and the APA to an activity enhances ac-
countability along all three measures. The APA and FOIA require
agencies to publish certain of their decisions in the Federal Register
and give the public the right to gain access to many agency
records.5 In accountability terms, FOIA most directly allows the
body politic to gain information about the operation of govern-
ment by requiring agencies to open many records to public inspec-
148. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
149. Related statutes include the Government in the Sunshine Act. Id. § 552b. In
order to avoid needless complication, the discussion in the text is confined to FOIA.
150. Id. §§ 551-559.
151. Agencies must publish rules that affect the public in the Federal Register. Id.
§ 552(a)(1)(D). A rule not properly published may not be used against a person lack-
ing actual notice of the rule. Id. § 552. Agencies are also required to "make available
for public inspection and copying" final opinions and orders in adjudications. Id.
§ 552(2)(A).
15532001]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JO URNAL[Vol. XXVIII
tion. FOIA furthers additional accountability interests because the
information made public under FOIA can be used to facilitate ef-
forts to influence government decision-making and to identify
which government entity is responsible for a particular action or
decision.
The APA increases the body politic's ability to influence govern-
ment action in rulemaking by providing for an open, somewhat po-
litical, rulemaking process. By specifying procedures for both
formal and informal adjudication, 52 the APA also increases the
ability of adjudicatory subjects to influence the outcome of their
cases. Further, by subjecting rulemaking and adjudication to judi-
cial review under various statutory standards of review,153 the APA
provides private parties a means of restraining agencies from acting
without good reason or beyond their statutory authority. Finally,
by requiring agencies to give notice of both adjudicatory and legis-
lative action,'54 the APA provides the public with information
about agency action, including which agency proposes to take what
action. Armed with this information, influencing agency action be-
comes possible.
Privatization threatens to undermine the accountability provided
by the APA and FOIA in several ways, some obvious and some not
so obvious. Most obviously, insofar as a private entity is not sub-
ject to the APA or FOIA, the accountability advantages of those
statutes are lost. For example, the records of a company adminis-
tering a social welfare program might not be available to the public
under FOIA because they would not be considered records of an
agency, 55 and the directors of the private company would be able
to meet in private, without regard to Sunshine Act requirements.
Private companies developing rules of thumb for dealing with
claims or other matters affecting the public might not have to pub-
lish those rules under the APA, and the lack of public access to
their records and meetings might make it difficult for the public to
even know of such rules' existence.
There are ways to maintain accountability in privatized situa-
tions. Agencies could require publication and openness, and courts
might hold benefits denials invalid if, for instance, they are made
152. See id. §§ 552(a)(1)(B), 554, 555(e), 556-557.
153. Id. §§ 704, 706.
154. Id. §§ 552(a)(2)(A)-(B), 553.
155. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 171 (1980) (holding that data produced by
private researchers in government funded study are not "agency records" subject to
FOIA disclosure).
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by a private contractor without publication by the agency of either
the agency's rules or the contractor's rules. Perhaps courts should
deem any rules (such as rules of thumb) developed by a private
contractor to be rules of the agency and apply the APA's publica-
tion requirement.' 56 Agencies also should provide clear instruc-
tions to private providers of government benefits, and should not
allow the private companies to make discretionary decisions that, if
made by an agency, would be subject to the APA and FOIA's ac-
countability enhancing procedures. Thus, it is possible to maintain
accountability in a privatized situation, but the process of account-
ability is at a minimum made more difficult by the privatization.
However, privatization also may threaten accountability in ways
that are not so obvious. Although an agency is obviously accounta-
ble for the decision to engage a private company to provide goods
or services, agency rules and records surrounding what are essen-
tially procurement decisions may be less open to public scrutiny
and influence under FOIA and the APA than other agency policy
decisions. Rules relating to agency management and contracts are
not subject to the APA's rulemaking requirements. 157 Government
contractors and agencies might be able to shield data submitted by
contractors to agencies from FOIA disclosure as "confidential,"
"commercial or financial information.1 158
The applicability of FOLA and the APA to government corpora-
tions and similar entities is worthy of separate attention. Congress
sometimes specifies whether a particular government corporation
should be considered an agency for the purposes of FOIA and the
APA.1 59 The statutory default rule is that a government corpora-
tion is subject to FOIA, even though it might not be subject to the
APA.'60 Thus, even though entities like Freddie Mac discussed
supra may not be subject to constitutional constraints or the re-
156. The APA's publication requirement is the primary mechanism that applies to
benefits-related rules since the APA's rulemaking provisions do not apply to rules
regarding government benefits. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2).
157. Rules relating to "agency management ... or to public property ... or con-
tracts" are not subject to the APA's rulemaking requirements. Id. § 553(a)(2).
158. Id. § 552(b)(4).
159. See Beermann, supra note 6, at 173, 176.
160. FOIA has a broader definition of "agency" than the APA. The APA defines
agency as "each authority of the Government of the United States" with enumerated
exceptions including Congress, the United States courts and territorial governments. 5
U.S.C. § 551(1) (1994). FOIA defines "agency" as "any executive department, mili-
tary department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or
other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Execu-
tive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." Id. § 552(f).
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quirements of the APA, they are subject to disclosure of records
under FOIA 1 61
In sum, for a variety or reasons, privatization might render the
APA and FOIA less effective in providing avenues for holding
agencies accountable. Congress or the relevant agency should take
care when contracting for the provision of goods and services to
ensure that private contractors operate under clear instructions
and do not exercise governmental discretion or coercive power
without an adequate substitute for the accountability protections
that apply to government. Perhaps Congress, and state legisla-
tures, should consider subjecting the records of government con-
tractors to FOIA-like disclosure obligations, at least when the
contractor is providing benefits directly to members of the public.
CONCLUSION
"Privatization" denotes a broad spectrum of the relationship be-
tween government and the private sector. In some circumstances,
such as government contracting out for support goods and services,
accountability is not likely to be a serious concern, because govern-
ment remains fully accountable for its procurement decisions re-
garding goods and services and because procurement decisions do
not directly affect members of the public. In other circumstances,
such as deregulation of personal relationships and business mat-
ters, reducing political accountability is the point of deregulation,
and the increase in personal and economic freedom is worth the
reduction of political accountability.
In recent years, attention has focused largely on contracting out
by government of the provision of goods and services to the public,
most notably with regard to social welfare and social insurance
programs. One serious concern that has been raised with regard to
this type of privatization is that private companies providing goods
and services to the public are less politically accountable than the
government agencies they replace. In general, if a private com-
pany is given detailed, comprehensive instructions by a govern-
ment agency, and that agency remains accountable for the
successes or failures of the private provider, the degree of political
accountability lost may be worth the gains in market accountability
161. See Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (concluding that Fred-
die Mac is subject to FOIA as a government controlled corporation); Energy Re-
search Found. v. Def. Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd., 917 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(finding that Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is subject to FOIA and Sunshine
Act).
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that competition over government contracts brings. If, however,
the private provider is not given detailed comprehensive instruc-
tions, but rather exercises discretion and coercive power over
members of the public, accountability concerns may be well
founded. Some reform, such as applying freedom of information
principles or procedural requirements akin to those in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, could go a long way toward alleviating ac-
countability concerns. It is important to look separately at each
type of privatization, and even each instance of privatization, with-
out lumping all privatizations together as positive or undesirable
along ideological lines.
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